CHINA AND RUSSIA IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S “NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY”, by Michele Nobile

IN DUE LINGUE (Inglese, Italiano)
IN TWO LANGUAGES (English, Italian)

With this piece – which was preceded by “US foreign policy and Trump’s contradictions: questions of method” –, Michele Nobile begins to deepen the analysis of the Trump administration’s foreign policy starting from the recently published National Security Strategy. [the Editorial staff of Red Utopia]

INDEX: Foreword - 1. Defining the problem of national security - 2. The theory of democratic peace in previous administrations - 3. The worldview of 2017 NSS and critique of the theory of democratic peace - 4. China and Russia in previous NSS - 5. China and Russia in 2017 NSS: threats to national security - 6. Relations between China and Russia in American strategy - 7. Provisional conclusion

Donald Trump and China’s president Xi Jinping. Beijing, November 9, 2017 © Nicolas Asfouri

Foreword

At the end of 2017, the Trump’s administration published its National Security Strategy (NSS), the report that the President of the United States is required to present annually to Congress. It is legitimate to ask what interest a document such as an NSS can have since it certainly contains no military action plans, not even in general terms.

An NSS is the result of compromises within the administration and is often overtaken by unforeseen developments; on the other hand, the availability of the means envisaged for achieving stated objectives can also exceed the duration of the administration that produced it – and not just by a few years.

The doubts increase in the face of a president like Trump – contested by foreign and military policy experts in his own party – and the series of sackings or resignations of high-level staff, both as a result of disagreements with the president and imposed by the results of investigations.

Of the thirty 20th-century Secretaries of State, Rex Tillerson is one of the six who have remained in office for the least time, and in the post-Cold War period only Lawrence Eagleburger lasted less. The Trump administration is on its third National Security Advisor in just over a year, while in the space of eight years Clinton and Bush Jr. had just two and Obama three.

Besides, it cannot be said that the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser appointed by Trump – Mike Pompeo, appointed as director of the CIA, and John Bolton, formerly ambassador to the United Nations under George W. Bush – are characters indicative of a moderate orientation: they are decidedly “hawks” chosen exclusively because of their political proximity to the president.

Furthermore, while all versions of the NSS pay a ritual homage to “American values”, it sounds strange to read in a document introduced by Donald Trump that “the United States rejects bigotry, ignorance and oppression” and that it is committed to defending the rights of women and girls (2017 NSS).

In more substantial terms, as widely predictable in some points, for example on Russia and on NATO, the 2017 NSS appears in contrast with the fears and hopes raised by Trump before his election. One can thus question the extent to which the document reflects the president’s thinking and therefore how reliable it is.

It is remarkable that Trump’s message preceding the latest NSS speaks of “rival powers” aggressive towards American interests in the world, but without naming China and Russia; then, in his speech of December 18, 2017 presenting the document, Trump cited the phone call from Putin thanking him for the intelligence that the CIA was able to provide concerning a major terrorist attack planned in St. Petersburg, but also said that the United States faces “rival powers, Russia and China, that seek to challenge American influence, values, and wealth”, specifying that, “based on my direction, this document has been in development for over a year. It has the endorsement of my entire Cabinet”.

It is not at all unusual for an NSS to be published beyond the terms prescribed by law, but this latter sentence appears as a superfluous clarification, a reassurance that seems to imply the opposite.

As for the rest, the discourse differs from the NSS only in its even more triumphalist tones and for the self-celebration of the presumed identification of the People with the president, elected with almost three million votes less than competitor Hillary Clinton:

“But last year, all of that began to change. The American people rejected the failures of the past. You rediscovered your voice and reclaimed ownership of this nation and its destiny.

On January 20, 2017, I stood on the steps of the Capitol to herald the day the people became the rulers of their nation again. (Applause.) Thank you. Now, less than one year later, I am proud to report that the entire world has heard the news and has already seen the signs. America is coming back, and America is coming back strong”.

Report on the national security strategy was established in 1986 by the Goldwater-Nichols Act: since then seventeen have been published. Well, if you compare 2017 NSS with those which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is clear that it is a very original document, almost on a par with the 2002 NSS of Bush Jr., who formulated the doctrine of “preventive war”.

While it is not possible to deduce from an NSS exactly what an administration will do and when, general indications can nevertheless be drawn about the perception of threats to national security and the attitude with which they are intended to be addressed.

The 2017 NSS contains relatively little about human rights and the promotion of democracy – a fact which may gratify the sympathisers of president Putin and North Korea’s supreme leader –, but the prospect it outlines, which in emphatic terms one might say grand strategy, is no less dangerous than the decision that led to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Perhaps even more so, in terms of relations with the nuclear powers of China and Russia and for reasons that are not only due to the constraints posed by the Congress, but are intrinsic to the concept of America First as defined by Trump.

The vision of the world contained in the 2017 NSS is substantially in line with that of Trump; however, in its realisation this same vision can lead to considerable fluctuations and confusion in the conduct of US foreign policy not only because of internal opposition, but because it is internally contradictory: this could be the reason for personal disagreements in the Administration, in which different parts push on the poles that constitute the contradiction.

The structure of 2017 NSS is made up of a message from Trump himself, an introduction and four chapters related to as many pillars of national security, plus a chapter that applies the strategy in the regions of the world.

Formally, each chapter presents some priority actions to achieve the objectives indicated, which is a novelty that appears to give concreteness, but which in reality is only stylistic; and also the four pillars or objectives – protecting the American people, promoting prosperity in America, preserving peace through force and advancing America’s influence – are banalities present in every NSS.

The peculiarity of this document must be sought in the way in which those objectives are concretely defined, above all in the definition of the problem of national security and threats.

1. Defining the problem of national security

The message signed by Donald Trump that serves as a preface to 2017 NSS is an arrogant revendication of the Administration’s alleged successes, including having “crushed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorists”, which, however, was claimed by all the players involved just before Trump took office.

The list of problems inherited from the previous administrations is long: “rogue states”, international terrorism, aggressive powers, uncontrolled immigration, criminal cartels, unequal distribution of defence costs between the United States and allies, impropriety in economic relations.

Against this background, the successes boasted with a triumphalist tone are even more evident: the Trump administration is already “charting a new and very different course”. The president stands as a saviour of the Fatherland, as the one who restored confidence in American values and America’s position in the world – “after one year, the world knows that America is prosperous, America is secure, and America is strong” (2017 NSS).

However, a note of alarm is sounded both in Trump’s message and in the text of the NSS itself: “The United States faces an extraordinarily dangerous world, filled with a wide range of threats that have intensified in recent years”. Apparently it seems a contradiction, but the alarmist note performs several functions.

First of all, keeping the alarm about terrorism and the “rogue states” high is a necessity intrinsic to the doctrine of war and preventive military operations, which is now one of the options for action openly indicated by all US administrations, albeit with different formulas.

Formalisation of this doctrine is a distortion of jus ad bellum (the right to engage in war), with implications also for jus in bello (the rules regulating the conduct of war, for example concerning the treatment of prisoners and civilian populations).

Even in a very broad and very debatable interpretation of the norms of international law, one of the binding criteria – and not the only one – which can justify a military action that anticipates an enemy attack is that of the imminence of aggression.

However, no matter how far it is cloaked in formal references to the needs of self-defence, in the logic of preventive war formalised since 2002 NSS the concept of the imminence of attack is freed from specific temporal and material references, and therefore emptied of real meaning.

The main justification for war and preventive military operations has become the possibility and intention that entities defined as terrorist or “rogue state” procure weapons of mass destruction; this is also tantamount to affirming that for these entities the possession of weapons of mass destruction coincides with the certainty of their use in an indeterminate future and place. War or preventive military operations are thus justified a priori.

…

…

In Trump’s introductory message to the NSS, the unequal sharing of security burdens between the United States and the allies is indicated as one of the reasons that has encouraged opponents to take dangerous actions – the point is then reiterated in the document. Obviously, it is not at all the alliances themselves that are called into question, but the terms with which the other States contribute.

However, the list of faults does not stop here. It covers the whole of the 90s, including the Administrations of Bush Sr. and Clinton, and implicitly also those of Bush Jr. In 2017 NSS, criticism of the idea that US military superiority was guaranteed is fundamental, as is criticism of the Wilsonian (after Woodrow Wilson, president from 1913 to 1921) concept of “democratic peace” which, although articulated in different ways, has been at the centre of the foreign policy pursued by the United States since the end of the Cold War.

REFLECTIONS ON TURKISH POLICY, by Pier Francesco Zarcone

IN DUE LINGUE (Inglese, Italiano)
IN TWO LANGUAGES (English, Italian)

© Shlomo Cohen

Has Turkey changed under Erdoğan? The question may seem absurd only due to the habit of considering Turkey a secular and Westernised country before Erdoğan came to power.

However, this consolidated image turns out to be false. There has been a change, but not in substance: what has changed is its exteriority. In fact, albeit with periodic recourse to elections, the country has always been governed in an authoritarian way, and today this feature is only more evident and its quality is more pronounced.

Mustafa Kemal and his successors made immense efforts to westernise Turkey quickly – too quickly – and they were apparently successful. Kemalist secularism never appropriated, for example, the French model, but limited itself to putting the Turkish religious world under political and state control and banning its public manifestations.

In the end, a centuries-old national history which had too hastily been sent to the museum of past things has re-emerged with cultural, spiritual and political strength.

On the other hand, the whole history of the Turks from their departure from the steppes of Central Asia has developed under the sign of Islam, and the Kemalist revolution – also imposed bloodily – had in many respects raped the identity of what we could call the “Turkish soul”.

If we want, Atatürk himself, without moustache and Western dress, gave a certain sense of artificiality. This does not mean that there is no longer a Westernised and secular sector in Turkish society, but only that it has lost political and cultural hegemony, and in addition it has proved to be in a minority.

In 2002, the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the elections and in a few years managed to penetrate the secular strongholds of public administration and justice that previously seemed impossible to conquer. Their power was neutralised and the same fate fell on the Armed Forces, in theory also a solid pillar and guardians of the Kemalist turnaround.

Ultimately, Erdoğan and the AKP have freed the profound sentiment of popular and Islamic Turkey, the Islamism of which – previously confined to the private sphere – has become free and of public significance.

The success is such that the portrait of Atatürk, still hanging on the walls of public offices, now no longer does damage and can remain where it is – after all it represents a moment of national victory for the Turks.

The victory of the AKP has not led to a new course of democracy, it has simply established a new cult of personality: that of Erdoğan instead of that of Mustafa Kemal. Some say that ultimately the Islamic turnaround was not an end in itself, but the instrument for the affirmation of Erdoğanism.

Now elected directly by the people, Erdoğan behaves as if he were the incarnation of the volonté générale of the Turkish nation. His power is fully consolidated: the AKP has the majority in Parliament, the Armed Forces have been tamed, the judiciary and the Constitutional Court are obedient, the mass media are mostly controlled and finally (and not least) the new masters of the country can distribute public procurement – both large and small – among their clients in peace.

One instrument in particular has shown singular effectiveness: the wide use of a rhetoric that blends victimism, neo-Ottoman arrogance, an internal-external conspiracy syndrome and the hunting of traitors.

This is an effective instrument, because it corresponds to a widespread attitude especially among the most working class, especially Anatolian, sectors and considered by many external observers as a psychological remnant of the troubled history of Ottoman imperial decline.

Treason is now perceived as present in anyone and in any sector that does not go along with the AKP. This is a very heterogeneous basin: Turkish left, Kemalists, liberals, Kurds and pro-Kurds, religious minorities such as the Alevites, the few Shiites in existence, some Armenian and/or Greek Orthodox survivors.

Traitors now include personalities who were once authoritative exponents of the AKP, but then fell into the unforgivable sin of political dissidence – albeit minimal: Abdullah Gül, one of the founders of the AKP and former president of the Republic; Bülent Arınç, also co-founder and former speaker of the Parliament; and finally Ahmet Davutoğlu, former minister of Foreign Affairs and president of the Council.

Fethullah Gülen is a well-known enemy, but it is worth recalling that without his support (due to the vast network of connections he had at his disposal) Erdoğan might not have succeeded in winning over the secular bureaucracy and the Armed Forces during the crucial period of 2011–12.

In addition there is the growing nostalgia for the Ottoman – that is Islamic imperial – period, a source of inspiration for Erdoğan’s variable and contradictory foreign policy, thanks to which Turkey remains in NATO but performs nonchalant “waltzes” with Russia.

Finally, there are the expansionist ambitions, which today are aimed at Syria, using the Kurdish obsession of Erdoğan as a pretext.

SEESAWING BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

On the Kurdish problem, the initial “opening” of the Turkish president did not last long, and he returned to the most obtuse Turkish nationalism and its basic lie: the Kurds do not exist, they are simply “Mountain Turks”.

Thanks also to the previous complicity of Erdoğan with the jihadists in Syria, a situation has now arisen in which the Syrian Kurds – connected with the PKK of Turkey – are not seen as enemies either by the Kremlin or by Washington; hence Erdoğan’s swinging between Russia and the United States, welcomed by his interlocutors in an opportunistic way when convenient, but always with suspicion.

Incidentally, the Kurdish-Syrian problem is not the only one to pollute relations between Ankara and Washington: it seems that investigators of the FBI are working on a dossier on Erdoğan, his family and related entourage for a fraud involving the Turkish State Bank regarding trade with Iran, subject to the accusation of violating US sanctions and banking laws.

The problem will become tangible if there are indictments against the suspects, with the risk of US sanctions against Turkey. In this case, the question could also – in theory – be reflected on Turkish membership of NATO. If this were to happen, a further Turkish rapprochement with Russia should not be surprising, notwithstanding the unknown quantity of Russian willingness (and possibility) to accept Turkish claims on the Kurds of Syria.

THE AFRIN ISSUE

Meanwhile, in Afrin things are not going very well for the troops of Ankara, struggling with a fierce resistance and technical difficulties in protecting their armoured vehicles, which in fact have suffered substantial losses. If the final battle were to arrive, the Turks would most likely win it, but at the price of very strong losses not only in terms of material resources, but also of human lives.

On the possibility or not of Russian acceptance of Turkish claims in Syria, a reflection is necessary. In Syria, Moscow has entered into agreements with the Damascus government for its geostrategic interests. The military presence of Russia requires that the country be stabilised and remain a friend; to this end there are no serious alternatives to Assad, whose government must be definitively strengthened and regain control of all Syrian territory. Not easy, but not impossible.

In light of this, Russia has no interest in supporting the Turkish claims, since it would clash with the government of Damascus leaving only a rather uncertain eventuality: that is to say that Ankara, pushing to the extreme, ends up breaking with NATO. As things stand, a prudent strategist can only wait for the fruit, in the case of maturation, to fall by itself into the metaphorical basket.

It is clear that the Afrin operation has a dual function: annihilate the Kurds in the border areas and establish a Turkish control zone in northern Syria, to be used as a basis for the anti-Assad jihadists supported by Ankara – perhaps giving Turkey the hegemony over what remains of Jihadism in Syria.

This would mean prolonging the Syrian conflict and nullifying government victories supported by the Russians. It follows that the Afrin operation goes against the interests of Russia: this is enough to disprove certain rumours about a prior agreement between Erdoğan and Putin.

It seems that the Assad regime has facilitated the transfer of Kurdish fighters in the Afrin area, and the logic of this initiative is clear: for now Kurdish ambitions do not threaten Damascus, but the same cannot be said in the case of a Turkish victory.

In the meantime, it looks like the Kurds have ceded some territories in the Aleppo area to government control. And if, as the al-Masdar agency claims, the Kurds will hand over the city of Manbij – a clear Turkish target – to the government in the near future, then it would mean that in order to continue Turkey would also go against Russia.

THE DILEMMA FOR RUSSIA

Here things become complicated for Russian policy, which is moving on a kind of tightrope. On the one hand, without Turkish cooperation the stability of Syria remains at risk; on the other hand, Ankara’s initiatives are at odds with this cooperation.

In addition, Moscow will have to avoid direct confrontation between Syrian and Turkish troops, and not only because the Syrians would have the worst of it: besides the serious deterioration of relations between Russia and Turkey (and so much for Syrian stabilisation), Moscow would receive not resistible pressure from Damascus and Tehran for its intervention, with potentially dangerous US countermoves.

But Turkey also has an interest in non-deterioration of its relations with Russia. The situation appears to be one of stalemate, but Moscow would have at least one chance to negotiate – especially if Kurdish resistance caused the Turks very heavy losses.

It would be a question of leveraging two factors: the fact that Ankara would still have achieved the objective of securing the Syrian border by blocking supplies between the Kurds of Syria and the PKK, as well as the costs – and dangers – that going beyond would imply.

At the same time, Moscow could act on the Kurds of Syria underlining the convenience of abandoning risky initiatives solicited by the United States – which would then leave them to their destiny – and convincing them, moreover, to soften their attitude towards the government of Damascus, because an agreement with it could have calming effects on Turkey.

A corollary would be to persuade Damascus to accept for the moment (and under Russian protection) both a Turkish presence in the north and the concession to the Kurds of some autonomy that would not be dangerous for the interests of Ankara.

FEAR AS A TOOL TO GAIN POWER, by Roberto Savio

This op-ed by Roberto Savio, IPS founder and President Emeritus, is adapted from a statement he made as a panelist on ‘Migration and Human Solidarity, a Challenge and an Opportunity for Europe and the MENA region’, held on 14 December at the Geneva Centre for Human Rights Advancement and Global Dialogue.

© El Roto

At the outset my thanks to Dr. Hanif Hassan Ali Al Qassim and ambassador Idriss Jazairy, who lead the Centre for Human Rights Advancement and Global Dialogue, for organizing this panel discussion at a critical moment in history. The Centre is one of the few actors for peace and cooperation between the Arab world and Europe. As a representative of global civil society, I think it will be more meaningful if I speak without the constraints of diplomacy and I make frank and unfettered reflections.

The misuse of religion, populism and xenophobia is a sad reality, which is not clearly addressed any longer, but met with hypocrisy and not outright denunciation. Only now the British are realizing that they voted for Brexit on the basis of a campaign of lies. But nobody has taken on publicly Johnson or Farage, the leaders of Brexit, after Great Britain accepted to pay, as one of the many costs of divorce, at least 45 billion euros, instead of saving 20 billion euros, as claimed by the ‘brexiters’. And there are only a few analysis on why political behaviour is more and more a sheer calculation, without any concern for truth or the good of the country.

President Trump could be a good case study on the relations between politics and populism. Just a few days ago the United States has declared that it is withdrawing from the UN Global Compact on Migration. This has nothing to do with the interest or the identity of the United States, which has built itself as a country of immigrants. It has to do with the fact that this decision is popular with a part of American population which is voting for President Trump, like the Evangelicals. I have here to show the message they are circulating, after the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This is what is said in the Bible. If we recreate the world described in the Bible, Jesus will make his second coming to earth, and only the righteous will be rewarded. And therefore they think that Trump brings the world closer to the return of Christ, and therefore he acts for the good of their beliefs. Evangelicals are close to thirty millions, and they strongly believe that, when the second coming of Jesus happens, He will recognize only them as the believers who are on the right path. Trump is not an Evangelical, and he has shown little interest in religion. But, as each of his actions, he is coherent with his views during the campaign, which brought together all the dissatisfied people, catapulting him into the White House. Everything he does is not in the interest of the world or of the United States. He is just focused on keeping the support of his electors – those who do not come from big towns, academia, media and the Silicon Valley. They come mainly from impoverished and uninformed white electors, who feel left out from the benefits of globalisation. They believe those benefits went to the elite, the big towns and the few winners, and believe there is an international plot to humiliate the United States. So, climate change for them and Trump is a Chinese hoax! During the first year, Trump can well have a shocking approval rating of 32%, the lowest in history for a President of the United States. But 92% of his voters would re-elect him. And as only 50% of Americans vote, he can conveniently ignore general public opinion.

It is not the place here to go deeper into American political trends. But Trump is a perfect example to see why a large number of Europeans – or even countries as Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic – are ignoring the decisions of the European Union on migrants, and why populism, xenophobia and nationalism are on the rise everywhere.

Fear has become the tool to get to power. Historians agree that two main engines of change in history are greed and fear.

Well, we have been trained, since the collapse of communism, to look to greed as a positive value. Market (not men or ideas) was the new paradigm. States were an obstacle to a free market. Globalisation – it was famously said – would lift all boats and benefit everybody. In fact, market without rules was self-destructive, and not all boats were lifted, but only yachts, the bigger the better. The rich became richer, and the poor poorer. The process is so speedy, that ten years ago the richest 528 people had the same wealth of 2.3 billion people. This year they have become 8, and this number is likely to shrink soon. All statistics are clear, and globalisation based on free market is losing some of its shine.

But meanwhile we have lost many codes of communication. In the political debate there is no more reference to social justice, solidarity, participation, equity, the values in the modern constitutions on which we built international relations. Now the codes are competition, success, profit and individual achievement. During my lectures at school, I am dismayed to see a materialistic generation who does not care to vote, to change the world. And the distance between citizens and political institutions is increasing every day. The only voices reminding us of justice and solidarity are voices from religious leaders: Pope Bergoglio, the Dalai Lama, Bishop Tutu, and the Grand Mufti Muhammad Hussein – just to name the most prominent. And with media who are now also based on market as the only criteria, those voices are becoming weaker.

After a generation of greed, we are now in a generation of fear. We should notice that, before the great economic crisis of 2009 (provoked by greed: banks have paid until now 280 billion dollars of penalties and fines), xenophobe and populist parties were always minorities (with exception of Le Pen in France). The crisis created fear and uncertainties, and then immigration started to rise, especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and that of Libya in 2011. We are now in the seventh year of the Syrian drama, which displaced 45% of the population. Merkel is now paying a price for her acceptance of Syrian refugees, and it is interesting to note that two thirds of the votes to Alternative für Deutschland, the populist and xenophobe party, come from former East Germany, that has few refugees, but an income which is nearly 25% lower. Fear, again, has been the engine for change of German history.

Europe was direct responsible for these migrations. A famous cartoonist, El Roto from El País, has made a cartoon showing bombs flying in the air, and migrants’ boats coming from the sea: “We send them bombs, and they send us migrants”. But there is no recognition of this. Those who escape from hunger and war are now depicted as invaders. Countries who until few years ago – like the Nordic ones – were considered synonymous with civic virtues, and spent a considerable budget for international cooperation, are now erecting walls and barbed wire. Greed and fear have been so successfully exploited by the new nationalist, populist and xenophobe parties that now keep growing at every election, from Austria to the Netherlands, from Czech Republic to Great Britain (where they created Brexit), and then Germany, and in a few months Italy. The three horses of apocalypse, which in the 1930s were the basis for the Second World War: nationalism, populism and xenophobia are back with growing popular support, and politicians openly riding them.