6. Relations between China and Russia in American strategy
In line with the “realistic” theoretical approach adopted in 2017 NSS, China and Russia are defined together as revisionist powers. The first question is: for which structure of the international order is revision feared?
In the early years of the 21st century, China became the world’s centre of exports and the ambitions of its foreign policy grew proportionally, both for procuring energy and raw materials and in terms of geopolitical claims in the Pacific Ocean.
However, the economic success of China would have been impossible without the international division of labour put in place by Western transnationals: it is due to Western target markets, primarily the North American one, and to the flow of capital and technology from abroad.
China has no interest in ousting the dollar from its position as a key international currency – the result would be an irreparable damage to competitiveness and the outlet for its exports; there are other methods of payment in bilateral agreements with Russia – and in destabilising the US economy.
The “peaceful rise” of China is started on the path of economic imperialism and the affirmation of a status of great regional power, extending means and sphere of security in the Pacific – what in jargon is called “Anti Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) capacity –, but this is a defensive measure not necessarily destined to create major crises. Obama had already started to address the issue with his pivot towards Asia.
Therefore, Chinese revisionism – if that is what it means – has its limits, and not only in terms of military capabilities. Capitalist “comrades” have integrated very well into the capitalist world economy and it is absurd to think that they intend to jeopardise the position reached with reckless actions on the international political scene or with economic policy decisions that could trigger the revolt of the working class against the oligarchy of the single party of the Chinese capital.
The case of Russia is more complex. Like a century ago and like China now, Russia needs countries with advanced capitalism and at the same time fears them, for the simple reason that, in relation to what the Soviet Union and its group of satellite states with limited sovereignty were, we are talking about a mutilated and weak imperialism but in precarious recovery.
Reconstitution of Russian power depends on the exports of gas to Europe, the proceeds of which Putin has brought into the State: the energy sector accounts for 20% of gross domestic product and contributes to over half of federal revenues.
This dependence on energy exports, which is anomalous and dangerous for a great power, also marks the oligarchic and rentier characteristics of Russian capitalism (one of the reasons for strong social inequality, given that gas and oil, unlike the “old” coal, are capital-intensive industries), and therefore the limits of Russian imperialism.
With the transition to capitalism, Russia has “westernised” and continues to look to the West: despite the Eurasian discourses, the Chinese world is foreign to it, while Putin’s sexist, militaristic and religiously orthodox palaeoconservatism poses as heir to the “real” values of traditionalism in the face of the moral decadence of Western Europe and, at the same time, as a continuer of Slavophile and Great-Russian imperialism.
The problem of Russia is that, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its geopolitical space in the broadest sense – demographic, socio-economic, military and cultural – is undefined, divided between now independent states which, in several cases, do not intend to reproduce the ancient imperial dependence on the Soviet regime, and – even worse – is afflicted by conflicts and opposing geopolitical orientations.
When all aspects are taken into consideration, it is the very identity of Russia that is problematic.
Under Putin, Russia has acquired the ability to strengthen ties with some former Soviet republics (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), and in order to prevent entry into NATO and the European Union it has embarked on a war with Georgia (facilitated by the adventurism of Georgian president Saakashvili) and promoted and supported the secessionism of the People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, in eastern Ukraine, also annexing the Crimea.
In other words, Putin has shown the intention to create a sphere of influence for Russian imperialism, leveraging the substantial Russian-speaking minorities in neighbouring republics. And so he entered into conflict with European and even more US imperialisms, which do not tolerate these kinds of exclusive spheres.
All this is exacerbated by the fact that the new Russia was born in the era of post-democracy: the emblematic fact of Russian post-democracy remains the political crisis of October 1993 between the president and Parliament, which culminated with the cannon fires ordered by Yeltsin against the Russian Parliament and its setting on fire.
And, although his foreign policy appears to be different from that of “White Crow”, Putin’s rise took place within the power system of Yeltsin, and it was Yeltsin himself who designated him as his successor.
With the deterioration of relations with the West, Putin’s regime has increasingly relied on Great-Russian nationalism and a moralism in line with the traditionalist and authoritarian right. If Putin were president of a Western European state, on the left many of those who support him would launch the alarm of “danger of authoritarian – or even fascist – populism”.
The second question is whether China and Russia constitute or can constitute a strategic Eurasian bloc that moves within a bipolar logic.
The core truth of this thesis is that the situation of these States has changed in relation to the last decade of the 20th century. Nevertheless, their positions in the world system are very different and in no case constitute social systems alternative to the capitalist system. At most, these are forms of capitalism “different” from the “Western” model.
Economic relations between China and Russia are very imbalanced in favour of China: Russia offers energy, weapons and cooperation to maintain the stability of the regimes of Central Asia; on the other hand, China exports industrial products, according to a type of exchange reminiscent of that between colony and metropolis, with a constant positive trade balance.
It should not be forgotten that for half a century – when Mao was still alive and the red flag flew over the Kremlin – Russia and China faced each other as enemies, with small battles on the border of the Ussuri river, in 1969, and an indirect war, in 1978, between China and Vietnam supported by the then USSR.
The problem of the border and control of the small islands at the confluence of the Ussuri and Amur rivers was closed between 2003 and 2005, but in the long run Russian specialists have reason to worry about the future of the Russian Far East in the face of the influence of an economic and demographic giant like China.
The Russian leadership needs Chinese support on the international political scene and of China for diversifying its own energy market – finding itself here in competition with Kazakhstan –, yet it also has reason to fear the growth of Chinese military power and its progressive independence from Russian weapons.
For their part, Chinese political leadership and businessmen have no interest in becoming involved in Russian attempts to create a sphere of influence in Europe: therefore they may support Russia, but certainly not to the point of seriously damaging their relations with the United States and its allies.
For example, China did not recognise the annexation of Crimea and in the UN Security Council did not vote against, but abstained in resolutions on the issue; on Syria, China and Russia together vetoed five resolutions, but in 2016 China abstained, while Russia vetoed; and apparently, due to their relations with the United States, Chinese banks in fact joined sanctions against Russia at least in part.
The tendency of 2017 NSS – and of other observers, both left and right – to treat China and Russia as if they formed a single strategic block is therefore a serious mistake, which confuses a tactical convergence of interests with a lasting alliance. The oligarchies of China and Russia have only one interest on which a true alliance is possible: protection of their own power from internal enemies that can be backed from abroad.
The problem is that in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet states two types of imperialism face each other: that of Russian capitalism – which, due to its economic weakness relative to Western capitalism, must directly exploit means such as energy blackmail and political-military pressure, also having to deal with anti-Russian nationalism, sedimented by a long history of national oppression and the tragedies of Stalinism – and the Western imperialism, which is much stronger economically and attractive as a political and social model.
7. Provisional conclusion
The actions taken up to now by the Trump administration are in direct contrast with those of Barack Obama, and the world view of 2017 NSS is very different from that of previous documents.
In an attempt to maintain US supremacy in the world – an indisputable goal for any US president –, Obama had also recognised the limits of American power, overtaken by Bush Jr.’s “war of choice” and marked by the prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by the global economic crisis in 2008.
Obama maintained, as always, the option of unilateral intervention “if necessary” and continued the “war on terror” in his own way, partly replacing armed drones with boots; but the emphasis fell on international cooperation, on the new role assigned to the G20, on multilateral treaties such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the climate agreement and the new START with Russia.
The fact remains that the great powers – and even the greatest among these – can only try to direct the movements of world society according to their own interests, but contradictions, conflicts and revolutions cannot be dominated by any power or group of powers.
Donald Trump’s foreign policy of America First is animated by a spirit of revenge that does not accept the limits of American power, which nevertheless remains by far the first in the world from all points of view.
What is more, this revenge is claimed to be simultaneously exercised in all fields and areas of world politics: not only against “revisionist powers” and “rogue states” – as well as terrorism – but, especially in economic relations, including vis-à-vis secure allies; in the meantime he adds fuel to the fire of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and promises a hard line on Iran, North Korea and Cuba.
This is a first and very serious contradiction of the Trump administration’s foreign policy. And it expresses the harbinger of a disaster attitude in the event of a new international financial crisis, as well as being a serious and real catastrophe for global climate prospects.
Secondly, as indicated above, the 2017 NSS does not distinguish adequately between China and Russia, thereby contradicting a pillar of US foreign policy dating back to the Nixon-Kissinger era. It is certainly possible that in this regard there are differences between the president and other high-level players in the Administration.
The fact is that, despite its alleged realism, in the Hobbesian and competitive logic of America First there is little room for the subtleties of Nixonian memory.
From Trump’s point of view, China is first and foremost an economic adversary, not understanding the integration of China in the flows of the international division of labour of the North American economy itself (a similar problem exists with Mexico) and in the supply of cheaper products for US workers; at the same time, Western imperialisms cannot accept the pretensions of exclusivity of Russian imperialism in its “near abroad”.
It is a contrast between imperialisms on the skin of the peoples concerned, which fuels the fire of nationalisms to the detriment of a united struggle against local capitalist oligarchies and of reasonable solutions to the difficult problem of nationalities in post-Soviet countries.
And although president Trump may think of a rapprochement with Putin, he finds himself with his hands tied. On the other hand, the plans for the development of conventional and nuclear military force, which are essential in the America First strategy, are not those of someone aiming at détente.
Thirdly, the logic of 2017 NSS makes it very difficult to solve the problem of the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, for which collaboration of the United States, China and Russia is important. The alternative is very dangerous, in this as in other possible areas of crisis.
Fourthly, in a much more marked way than previous ones, Trump’s foreign policy appears to be conceived essentially as a function of domestic politics and aimed at the political consolidation of the clique around his person. In this it presents a strange similarity with the role of Russian foreign policy in consolidating the Putin regime, which has progressively exalted Russia’s “mission of civilisation”.
However, while the link between the domestic politics and foreign policy in the Putin regime has its own coherence, adapted to the particularities of Russian capitalism, Trump’s strategy does not seem adequate to the overall and global interests of US capitalism; nor does it seem adequate to the demands of the internal legitimacy of a country that is culturally more modern and variegated than Russia.
In this regard, it must be recalled that the establishment of the national security report is not the most important aspect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. That same law reorganised the Department of Defense, streamlining and centralising the chain of command and at the same time giving more authority to commanders in the field; secondly, it promoted operational integration between the army and air forces according to the doctrine of AirLand Battle.
In addition to its effects in planning and conducting operations, the point is important because, making military commands – both functional and in different regions of the planet – answer directly to the Secretary of Defense and in this way to the President, further strengthened the authority of civil power with regard to the military apparatus.
However, it is by no means certain that the authorities of civil power are less inclined to the use of force than those of the military, and it is not uncommon for the opposite to be true; it is important to remember that the commander-in-chief of the US Armed Forces is the President.
And when the president is a programmatically warlike character like Donald Trump, there is some cause for concern: he does not necessarily listen to the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Finally, it can be said that in some respects the 2017 NSS represents a return to the era of Bush Jr., but in an international context that is much changed with respect to the first years of the 21st century.
As for the view of the world, it is even more backward than that of second generation neoconservatives. It expresses a paleoconservative mindset full of contradictions that can lead to new, dangerous adventures.