REFLECTIONS ON TURKISH POLICY, by Pier Francesco Zarcone

IN DUE LINGUE (Inglese, Italiano)
IN TWO LANGUAGES (English, Italian)

© Shlomo Cohen

Has Turkey changed under Erdoğan? The question may seem absurd only due to the habit of considering Turkey a secular and Westernised country before Erdoğan came to power.

However, this consolidated image turns out to be false. There has been a change, but not in substance: what has changed is its exteriority. In fact, albeit with periodic recourse to elections, the country has always been governed in an authoritarian way, and today this feature is only more evident and its quality is more pronounced.

Mustafa Kemal and his successors made immense efforts to westernise Turkey quickly – too quickly – and they were apparently successful. Kemalist secularism never appropriated, for example, the French model, but limited itself to putting the Turkish religious world under political and state control and banning its public manifestations.

In the end, a centuries-old national history which had too hastily been sent to the museum of past things has re-emerged with cultural, spiritual and political strength.

On the other hand, the whole history of the Turks from their departure from the steppes of Central Asia has developed under the sign of Islam, and the Kemalist revolution – also imposed bloodily – had in many respects raped the identity of what we could call the “Turkish soul”.

If we want, Atatürk himself, without moustache and Western dress, gave a certain sense of artificiality. This does not mean that there is no longer a Westernised and secular sector in Turkish society, but only that it has lost political and cultural hegemony, and in addition it has proved to be in a minority.

In 2002, the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the elections and in a few years managed to penetrate the secular strongholds of public administration and justice that previously seemed impossible to conquer. Their power was neutralised and the same fate fell on the Armed Forces, in theory also a solid pillar and guardians of the Kemalist turnaround.

Ultimately, Erdoğan and the AKP have freed the profound sentiment of popular and Islamic Turkey, the Islamism of which – previously confined to the private sphere – has become free and of public significance.

The success is such that the portrait of Atatürk, still hanging on the walls of public offices, now no longer does damage and can remain where it is – after all it represents a moment of national victory for the Turks.

The victory of the AKP has not led to a new course of democracy, it has simply established a new cult of personality: that of Erdoğan instead of that of Mustafa Kemal. Some say that ultimately the Islamic turnaround was not an end in itself, but the instrument for the affirmation of Erdoğanism.

Now elected directly by the people, Erdoğan behaves as if he were the incarnation of the volonté générale of the Turkish nation. His power is fully consolidated: the AKP has the majority in Parliament, the Armed Forces have been tamed, the judiciary and the Constitutional Court are obedient, the mass media are mostly controlled and finally (and not least) the new masters of the country can distribute public procurement – both large and small – among their clients in peace.

One instrument in particular has shown singular effectiveness: the wide use of a rhetoric that blends victimism, neo-Ottoman arrogance, an internal-external conspiracy syndrome and the hunting of traitors.

This is an effective instrument, because it corresponds to a widespread attitude especially among the most working class, especially Anatolian, sectors and considered by many external observers as a psychological remnant of the troubled history of Ottoman imperial decline.

Treason is now perceived as present in anyone and in any sector that does not go along with the AKP. This is a very heterogeneous basin: Turkish left, Kemalists, liberals, Kurds and pro-Kurds, religious minorities such as the Alevites, the few Shiites in existence, some Armenian and/or Greek Orthodox survivors.

Traitors now include personalities who were once authoritative exponents of the AKP, but then fell into the unforgivable sin of political dissidence – albeit minimal: Abdullah Gül, one of the founders of the AKP and former president of the Republic; Bülent Arınç, also co-founder and former speaker of the Parliament; and finally Ahmet Davutoğlu, former minister of Foreign Affairs and president of the Council.

Fethullah Gülen is a well-known enemy, but it is worth recalling that without his support (due to the vast network of connections he had at his disposal) Erdoğan might not have succeeded in winning over the secular bureaucracy and the Armed Forces during the crucial period of 2011–12.

In addition there is the growing nostalgia for the Ottoman – that is Islamic imperial – period, a source of inspiration for Erdoğan’s variable and contradictory foreign policy, thanks to which Turkey remains in NATO but performs nonchalant “waltzes” with Russia.

Finally, there are the expansionist ambitions, which today are aimed at Syria, using the Kurdish obsession of Erdoğan as a pretext.

SEESAWING BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

On the Kurdish problem, the initial “opening” of the Turkish president did not last long, and he returned to the most obtuse Turkish nationalism and its basic lie: the Kurds do not exist, they are simply “Mountain Turks”.

Thanks also to the previous complicity of Erdoğan with the jihadists in Syria, a situation has now arisen in which the Syrian Kurds – connected with the PKK of Turkey – are not seen as enemies either by the Kremlin or by Washington; hence Erdoğan’s swinging between Russia and the United States, welcomed by his interlocutors in an opportunistic way when convenient, but always with suspicion.

Incidentally, the Kurdish-Syrian problem is not the only one to pollute relations between Ankara and Washington: it seems that investigators of the FBI are working on a dossier on Erdoğan, his family and related entourage for a fraud involving the Turkish State Bank regarding trade with Iran, subject to the accusation of violating US sanctions and banking laws.

The problem will become tangible if there are indictments against the suspects, with the risk of US sanctions against Turkey. In this case, the question could also – in theory – be reflected on Turkish membership of NATO. If this were to happen, a further Turkish rapprochement with Russia should not be surprising, notwithstanding the unknown quantity of Russian willingness (and possibility) to accept Turkish claims on the Kurds of Syria.

THE AFRIN ISSUE

Meanwhile, in Afrin things are not going very well for the troops of Ankara, struggling with a fierce resistance and technical difficulties in protecting their armoured vehicles, which in fact have suffered substantial losses. If the final battle were to arrive, the Turks would most likely win it, but at the price of very strong losses not only in terms of material resources, but also of human lives.

On the possibility or not of Russian acceptance of Turkish claims in Syria, a reflection is necessary. In Syria, Moscow has entered into agreements with the Damascus government for its geostrategic interests. The military presence of Russia requires that the country be stabilised and remain a friend; to this end there are no serious alternatives to Assad, whose government must be definitively strengthened and regain control of all Syrian territory. Not easy, but not impossible.

In light of this, Russia has no interest in supporting the Turkish claims, since it would clash with the government of Damascus leaving only a rather uncertain eventuality: that is to say that Ankara, pushing to the extreme, ends up breaking with NATO. As things stand, a prudent strategist can only wait for the fruit, in the case of maturation, to fall by itself into the metaphorical basket.

It is clear that the Afrin operation has a dual function: annihilate the Kurds in the border areas and establish a Turkish control zone in northern Syria, to be used as a basis for the anti-Assad jihadists supported by Ankara – perhaps giving Turkey the hegemony over what remains of Jihadism in Syria.

This would mean prolonging the Syrian conflict and nullifying government victories supported by the Russians. It follows that the Afrin operation goes against the interests of Russia: this is enough to disprove certain rumours about a prior agreement between Erdoğan and Putin.

It seems that the Assad regime has facilitated the transfer of Kurdish fighters in the Afrin area, and the logic of this initiative is clear: for now Kurdish ambitions do not threaten Damascus, but the same cannot be said in the case of a Turkish victory.

In the meantime, it looks like the Kurds have ceded some territories in the Aleppo area to government control. And if, as the al-Masdar agency claims, the Kurds will hand over the city of Manbij – a clear Turkish target – to the government in the near future, then it would mean that in order to continue Turkey would also go against Russia.

THE DILEMMA FOR RUSSIA

Here things become complicated for Russian policy, which is moving on a kind of tightrope. On the one hand, without Turkish cooperation the stability of Syria remains at risk; on the other hand, Ankara’s initiatives are at odds with this cooperation.

In addition, Moscow will have to avoid direct confrontation between Syrian and Turkish troops, and not only because the Syrians would have the worst of it: besides the serious deterioration of relations between Russia and Turkey (and so much for Syrian stabilisation), Moscow would receive not resistible pressure from Damascus and Tehran for its intervention, with potentially dangerous US countermoves.

But Turkey also has an interest in non-deterioration of its relations with Russia. The situation appears to be one of stalemate, but Moscow would have at least one chance to negotiate – especially if Kurdish resistance caused the Turks very heavy losses.

It would be a question of leveraging two factors: the fact that Ankara would still have achieved the objective of securing the Syrian border by blocking supplies between the Kurds of Syria and the PKK, as well as the costs – and dangers – that going beyond would imply.

At the same time, Moscow could act on the Kurds of Syria underlining the convenience of abandoning risky initiatives solicited by the United States – which would then leave them to their destiny – and convincing them, moreover, to soften their attitude towards the government of Damascus, because an agreement with it could have calming effects on Turkey.

A corollary would be to persuade Damascus to accept for the moment (and under Russian protection) both a Turkish presence in the north and the concession to the Kurds of some autonomy that would not be dangerous for the interests of Ankara.

ERDOĞAN’S NEO-OTTOMANISM AT A DANGEROUS TURNING POINT, by Pier Francesco Zarcone

IN DUE LINGUE (Inglese, Italiano)
IN TWO LANGUAGES (English, Italian)

© TIME Magazine/Marco Grob

It is not being dealt with by major media, but there appear to be new and dangerous winds of war about to blow in the eastern Mediterranean.

On October 15, 2016, in a speech at the university that (modestly) bears his name, the Turkish president outlined some lines of his new foreign policy, announcing the intention to regain territories lost by the Ottoman Empire following defeat in the First World War, with specific reference to Western Thrace and the Dodecanese, all areas belonging to Greece, in theory an ally of Turkey in NATO.

In December 2017 he was echoed by the head of the secular neo-Kemalist opposition, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), who announced that Turkey would invade eighteen Greek islands in 2019 – as then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit had done with Cyprus in 1974 – stating that “there is no document” demonstrating that these islands belong to Greece. This was to happen – and here lies the gravity of the situation – if his party (apparently Social Democratic) were to win the next elections.

Another sign came in Erdoğan’s speech on February 17 at a congress of his party (AKP) held in Eskişehir. Speaking of the military action against Syrian Kurds, he proclaimed:

“Those who think that we have erased from our hearts the lands from which we withdrew in tears a hundred years ago are wrong. We say at every opportunity we have that Syria, Iraq and other places in the geography [map] in our hearts are no different from our own homeland. Wherever the call to prayer is understood, we fight so that we do not brandish a foreign flag. What has been done so far is nothing compared with the even more imposing attacks that we expect for the coming days: God wills it!”.

Then, on his recent visit to Athens, Erdoğan had addressed – albeit only at the diplomatic level – the problem constituted by those Aegean Islands situated near Anatolia that the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 had assigned to Greece, expressing the need for a review of that agreement.

In the meantime, it is worth noting, the final touches were being put to the sale to Turkey of the ultramodern Russian S-400 anti-missile system, an initiative highly criticised by NATO also because it is not compatible with other weapon systems used by the Atlantic Alliance.

It should be recalled that the Treaty of Lausanne – replacing the previous Treaty of Sèvres, which had been degrading for what remained of the Ottoman Empire – recognised the reconquest of the whole of Anatolia by Kemalist forces, and that in view of this the attribution to Greece of the now contested Thracian islands and territories was acceptable.

It was also a sort of sop to Athens, ruinously defeated by Atatürk after being installed with British support in the area of Smyrna, in the crazy dream of partly rebuilding the Byzantine Empire (it was the so-called Megali Idea).

The worrying episodes that form part of this pre-war climate are not lacking, and the recent confrontation in the Aegean between the Greek offshore patrol vessel 090 Gavdos and the Turkish patrol boat Umut was only one element of the series. On July 28, 2017, for example, a Turkish CN-235 spy plane was intercepted by the Greeks, and shortly afterwards, on August 12, eleven Turkish F-16 planes trespassed in Greek air space over a twelve-hour period, resulting in thirteen occasions on which as many Greek planes engaged in interception. The trespassing took place in the skies of Limnos, Lesvos, Samos and Chios.

That belligerent revanchist intentions also rub off on the Turkish opposition is serious both in and of itself, and because the neo-Kemalists would be expected to have it clear why Atatürk had warned several times not to make enemies on the borders: the good and security of Turkey.

Today, Ankara’s troops (and as many enemies) are outside the borders of the Turkish Republic in the occupied part of Cyprus, northern Syria and Iraq.

In the Iraqi area of Mosul, Turkish troops are present once again without the permission of the Baghdad government, which in fact speaks of invasion. In the Mosul region, according to former Greek Chief of Staff General Fragkos Fragkoulis, Turkey intends to secure access to Iraqi oil. Would it be a surprise if, sooner or later, Erdoğan were to claim (perhaps resorting also to military action) the entire territory of the former vilayet of Mosul, to which Kemalist Turkey effectively aspired but which was assigned to Iraq by British will?

At this point the current operation in Syria presents disturbing connotations, which could lead to international complications and bloodshed. The problem is to understand against whom the “imperial” intentions of Erdoğan are really directed.

It is now so evident that the doors of Europe are closed for Turkey that the majority of Turks themselves have stopped taking it into account, and perhaps – with the Islamist wind that is blowing – they no longer want to enter.

Another example of how political myopia strikes “indirectly”: if instead of closing up (hypocritically, without saying so) into racist xenophobia and paranoid anti-Islamism – yet having a higher, clearly deficient cultural level – European leaders had taken the opportunity to allow that country in when the assertively “moderate” Muslims still did not have power, today we would perhaps have a different situation and different problems.

And probably the AKP could have counted on one less card: dangerous wounded Turkish pride, which inevitably falls back on the old saying: “the Turk has no friend but the Turk”.

Today Erdoğan, whose popular consensus does not seem to have waned, is angry with so many: Germany, the European Union, NATO and the United States, partly because of the failed coup against him – most likely triggered by his Western “allies” – and with the addition that archenemy Fethullah Gülen continues to live peacefully in the United States. It cannot be ruled out that the hostile attitude towards Greece is part of a plan to create difficulties for NATO, of which both countries are part.

An article recently appeared in the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak (perfectly aligned with Erdoğan) which, while on the one hand it increased Greek concerns, on the other may provide elements of interpretation. Its author, İbrahim Karagül – an AKP “hardliner” considered the President’s unofficial spokesperson – writes that Erdoğan’s latest move follows the persistence of Western ambiguities and especially of the United States, false friend of Turkey and accomplice of the Kurdish enemy.

At this point, once the country had reunited around him, he would lead it to a new “war of independence” (after that of Atatürk), having all those who dared not to follow him classed as traitors of their country. In theory there could be neo-Kemalists among them, and perhaps (stressing perhaps) this would explain Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s “putting on a fierce face”. But this is not necessarily the case, because Turks are very sensitive to hyper-nationalist contagion.

On the fringes there are Erdoğan’s nods to Russia, being understood that in Moscow it is well known how unreliable the Turkish president is. But he is not behaving well even as far as Russia is concerned, as shown by the “Olive Branch” operation, which can also be seen as part of a broader strategy in which the neo-Ottoman dreams of Islamic “moderate” Erdoğan can turn into a nightmare for others.

Recent events on the battlefield of Afrin make the possibilities of an extensive confrontation between Turkish and Syrian troops anything but unrealistic.

Since it does not appear that the recent mass purges in the armed forces have reinforced its efficiency, if Syria reacts with the aid of Moscow, Erdoğan could end up calling on NATO for help, regardless of having previously pontificated that the obligations of the Atlantic Alliance do not extend to the Near East.

The Russians have so far maintained a cautious attitude, but as a successful ally of Assad they could not lose face by leaving the field open to Turkey. The fact is that it would not be Turkey that had been attacked – bearing in mind that the fighting is in Syrian and not Turkish territory –, but it would not be strange if, by turning the tables, Erdoğan were to argue (in the Israeli way) that his was a preventive action to prevent Kurdish aggression.

The Turkish President proves to be a good student of the US school of international politics – under which, when it is convenient, international law is waste paper – in the uninhibited violations of other countries’ borders, as shown by the case of armed intrusion in energy exploration in the sea around Cyprus, a sovereign country and member of the European Union, at whose door Erdoğan pretends to keep knocking.

For several days, Turkey has blockaded the drilling vessel Saipem, chartered by ENI and duly authorised by the Cypriot government, citing completely unfounded claims based on international treaties.

The 1982 Treaty of Montego Bay establishes that the sovereignty of a State extends up to 12 nautical miles from its coast; however for the specific case of the exclusive exploitation of minerals and hydrocarbons it is extended to the whole of its continental platform, to be understood as the natural extension of landmass until it is at a more or less constant depth before sinking. But arrogance always pays.

And the poor and crippled Greece, left high and dry by the European Union? It has asked the United States for protection! In fact, its right-wing Minister of Defence, Panos Kammenos, has offered the Americans new bases in the Aegean; this is a risky move given the high rate of Washington’s betrayal of its allies in their moment of need, and then because it was done precisely to infuriate the Turks.

At the worst, hope costs nothing, but in this case what the object of hope might be is not clear. Hope for Turkey getting bogged down in Syria? But even if that were the case, can we be sure that Erdoğan would not seek revenge on the very weak Greece?

Hope that, in the meantime, he will satisfy his imperial appetites in the Near East? Apart from the fact that it does not go without saying that this will happen, nevertheless, even if it were to happen, there is no guarantee that his imperial appetite would be satisfied, especially if he were really intent on reconquering former Ottoman territories lost in the Near East and Europe.

A seemingly insane design, but considering all the factors in the field – including the tried and tested unwarlike nature of the various players – it is not certain that it really is, even if the consequences would be insane.

TRUMP’S KURDISH MILITIA IN SYRIA, by Pier Francesco Zarcone

IN DUE LINGUE (Inglese, Italiano)
IN TWO LANGUAGES (English, Italian)

Turkish offensive in the Syrian district of Afrin © Syria Live Map

The US decision to train about 30,000 men of a Kurdish militia on the Turkish-Syrian border was considered a reckless initiative with catastrophic consequences – and that immediately turned out to be the case –, but, paradoxically, it is also understandable in the global Syrian situation. Let us leave aside the issue of violation of the sovereignty of the Syrian state, given that the United States makes and undoes international law as it pleases and the media present this as if it were normal.

The reasons for judging this move as reckless can be easily identified. The lesser of these lies in the notorious unreliability of Kurdish political-military organisations, accompanied by bungling opportunism and yet constantly exploited and betrayed by their allies of the moment.

Given that the initiative in question means strengthening the Kurdish presence in northern Syria – that is below the Turkish border –, it was also obvious that the Ankara government would never have let pass such a precedent in favour of an armed nucleus which it considers affiliated to the PKK in Turkey.

If we want to be really realistic, even at the cost of seeming brutal, it is now clearly established that exclusively in the presence of particular historical conditions – as happened in Iraq – it is possible for a Kurdish population to achieve forms of autonomy within the State in which it resides. But independence is not going to happen: this was seen with the miserable end of the Kurdish-Iraqi independence referendum, which was completely disregarded by the immediate blocking position implemented by the governments of Baghdad, Ankara and Tehran.

It was not therefore difficult to predict that for the Syrian Kurds a positive response to US pandering would have exposed them to Turkish reaction. And it does not seem that Washington is helping them, just as it remained silent when the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum provoked the aforementioned reactions.

A further example of recklessness (and harmful conduct for the Kurds), if indeed the United States thought of strengthening Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria, concerns the fact that – even apart from the inevitable Turkish reaction – the hostility of Damascus, Ankara and Baghdad in the face of this initiative imposed by Washington would have once again led to a military and economic block on the area in question, which could not have survived for long.

Moreover – and not unimportantly – it should be noted that once again the United States has prepared a beautiful gift for Russian foreign policy. Turkey may well be a NATO ally, but it has long taken care of its own political and economic interests.

The choice of favouring a phantom Syrian Free Army had proved a failure, due to the military and political inconsistency of this opposition – moreover “pseudo-moderate” –, rapidly overwhelmed by jihadists of various tendencies and finally by ISIS; and also the legitimation of al-Nusra (affiliated to al-Qaeda!) has come to nothing, with its militias having been badly bruised by the action of Assad’s army and the shots of ISIS.

Perhaps Ankara would have turned a blind eye to the mere US project of using the Syrian areas controlled by the Kurds as a starting point for further actions in Syria and Iraq, but militarily reinforcing this enclave also means creating a base of support for Kurdish separatists in Turkey – and under a US umbrella.

Meanwhile, it is reported that during a telephone call with his Turkish counterpart, Hulusi Akar, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Major-General Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, asked for guarantees on Syrian territorial integrity and safeguarding of the peace talks in Astana.

That Damascus should protest the Turkish action is more than natural, but it is highly probable that Assad and Putin will remain watching the course of events: after all, Erdoğan also works for them. Not only does the deterioration in relations between Ankara and Washington go down well in Damascus and Moscow, but above all, if Turkey were to crush Syrian Kurdish militias, the consequence would be the need for the United States to withdraw physically from Syria.

Tehran would also gloat, because in this case the US-Israeli plan against Iran would be greatly weakened. Once again, we will see, but if Turkey were able to deliver heavy blows to Washington’s Kurdish allies in Syria, Trump & Co. would receive a hard blow to their image. Meanwhile, Ankara quietly continues to cooperate with Moscow in the preparation of the Congress for the Syrian National Dialogue (between government and opposition representatives), expected in Sochi between January 29 and 30.

We are facing an initiative that is both desperate and understandable at the same time. In fact, in the situation brought about by decided and decisive Russian intervention, all that now remains for the United States is to “stick to the Kurds”, if it wants to maintain a physical presence in Syria.

The choice of favouring a phantom Syrian Free Army had proved a failure, due to the military and political inconsistency of this opposition – moreover “pseudo-moderate” – rapidly overwhelmed by jihadists of various tendencies and finally by ISIS; and also the legitimation of al-Nusra (affiliated to al-Qaeda!) has come to nothing, with its militias having been badly bruised by the action of Assad’s army and the shots of ISIS.

Abstractly speaking, the convergence towards the Kurds could have been a usable card, undoubtedly dangerous, but not without some utility if played wisely, that is to say without overdoing it. This is not how it turned out and, once again, the United States has behaved as if only it existed in the world.

SYRIA, QATAR, GAZA: PLOT THICKENS IN THE NEAR EAST, by Pier Francesco Zarcone

IN DUE LINGUE (Inglese, Italiano)
IN TWO LANGUAGES (English, Italian)

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visits Ankara, June 7, 2017 © Yasin Bulbul

We know that international legality goes no further than pious aspirations, so all that counts is force and tactical-strategic capacity of its use.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS

Well, the United States edged its way into Syria on its own account – that is, without the Damascus government having called on it – in order to achieve two interrelated goals.

First, to save the self-styled anti-Assad Syrian Democratic Forces which had suffered blows from both ISIS and the Syrian Arab Army of Damascus – to the extent that it was necessary to link them up with the Kurdish militia of Syria to give a semblance of existence.

Second, to break the potential territorial continuity between Syria, Iraq and Iran – that is, the so-called “Shiite corridor”.

To date, none of these goals has come to fruition, and Washington is facing complications that are not indifferent.

The use of the Kurds has inevitably led to the hostility of Turkey, NATO’s most important partner in the eastern Mediterranean, and it is practically impossible to rule out that Ankara will stand by without doing anything faced with the rise of a Kurdish entity in northern Syria. In this regard, a storm is brewing, from which Russia will benefit.

As for the second point, the failure to interrupt the Shiite corridor, which implied in practice US occupation of south-east Syria, should be noted (US troops were stationed at the al-Tanf border crossing between Syria and Iraq). As the Syrian army approached al-Tanf, the United States responded with bombing and unilaterally declaring a “deconfliction zone” around it.

In this way, it also counted on interrupting Iranian supplies to the Lebanese Hezbollāh; but the fundamental objective was to take control of an area from the Saudi-Iraq border in the province of Al Anbar – in western Iraq – across south-eastern Syria and north-eastern Syria occupied by the Kurds.

Instead, it was Syrian troops supported by Iraqi troops that connected western Syria with the border north of al-Tanf and met up with the Iraqis north-east of the border crossing, as well as advance towards Abu Kamal and the Euphrates valley.

For its part, the Russian command has warned Washington that military action aimed at changing the situation thus created would be a hostile act to which it would react.

Iran has made itself heard by launching medium-range missile from its territory on ISIS positions in Syria. With missiles launched from its ships in the Mediterranean, Russia has bombed jihadist positions, while Iraqi militias have marched from the south towards al-Tanf. As a result, the small US contingent present there has been put out of harm’s way – at least for the time being.

On Syria, it is interesting to read the recent interview by Robert S. Ford – US ambassador in that country from 2010 to 2014 – with the Arab daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, which was obviously ignored by the “politically correct” media.

After recalling that at the beginning it was considered safe to bring down the government of Bashar al-Assad – while the situation changed following the involvement of Iran, Russia and Hezbollāh, as a result of which the Syrian army recovered and took back increasingly more territory – Ford wanted to warn the Kurds of Syria vis-a-vis the United States, pointing out that Washington never intended to help them in their aspirations once Raqqa had been conquered, thus making it understood that they would find themselves on their own against the governments of Damascus and Ankara.