5. Conceptual fetishism: multilateralism/unilateralism, unipolarity/multipolarity
US foreign policy is mostly characterised by dichotomies: internationalism/isolationism, multilateralism/unilateralism, universalism/exceptionalism, interventionism/non-interventionism, hegemony/empire, hard power/soft power.
The use of these pairings could be mainly descriptive, but in fact it is strongly normative: it serves to indicate what should be the right policy. And, especially when they are used as if one term were the antithesis of the other, they do not really explain the policies actually pursued because, in practice, the peculiar nature of administrations and their particular tone result from the way in which all the trends expressed by those terms merge with each other, from their relative weight in defence or international economic policies, and in different moments and situations.
After criticism, they can only serve as generically descriptive terms, not as explanatory concepts.
For example: Obama vigorously insisted on multilateralism – economic as well as political and military, as with the Libyan crisis – and on compliance with international standards, but did not hesitate to act unilaterally, such as with the massive and lethal use of drones in countries with which the United States was not at war (Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Yemen), and to give the go-ahead to an operation – the purge of Osama bin Laden – which violated the sovereignty of Pakistan in spectacular fashion.
The panorama becomes even more complicated if we consider that terms such as unilateralism and multilateralism refer to policies, while polarity (uni-, bi-, tri- or multi-) refer to the structure of the international system, as a matter of fact or a policy objective.
Logically, policies and structures can be combined in different ways: for example, the goal of maintaining or achieving a unipolar world can be pursued with a unilateral or multilateral policy; inversely, the goal of a multipolar world can be pursued in a unilateral or multilateral way.
So we can say that the American neoconservatives are unipolar and unilateralist, but paleoconservatives like Pat Buchanan are multipolar and unilateralist, and most neoliberals are unipolar and multilateralist.
The European Union could be called multipolar and multilateralist, but how could Hitler or Stalin have been classified? Multipolar and unilateralist? And Russia or China today?
Could we say that, in order to make progress in the multipolar world and create one’s own spheres of influence – as opposed to the “hegemonism” of the United States, but also in latent contrast between them –, multilateralism and unilateralism are combined according to convenience and the opportunity to legitimise unequal relationships?
It is very doubtful whether a unipolar world ever existed or could exist; as for multilateralism, in reality it is a battlefield: the strongest can come to feel like Gulliver among the Lilliputians, or the latter can have a totally unbalanced relationship with the giant.
The dichotomies are even more misleading when applied as if their particular meaning remained unchanged when referring to a period of the 19th century, the period between the world wars, after World War II, the 1980s or the more recent international scene.
Changes in the balance of power among classes within countries and processes of national liberation, changes in national political regimes, relations between the great powers, lethality of armaments (the nuclear weapon marks an epochal discontinuity), and transformations of the world economy come into play.
The fundamental problem of the concepts of the prevailing theories of international relations which are variants of neorealism is that, although applied to different historical situations and to transformations of the international system of States, they are socially and historically indeterminate.
States are assumed as “black boxes”, their economy is considered only as regards the contribution to military power and their position in the structure of the international system; and dominant States oriented towards maintenance of the statu quo differ from revisionist States of the existing order, regardless of the specificity of their societies.
Consequently, the definition of “national interest” refers to the survival and integrity of the State, assumed as a fetish that conceals the stratification of society, the class nature of political power and the various international political interests that may derive from the contrasts among social classes.
When we take into consideration the subjectivity of statesmen and the perception of threats and opportunities, this is nevertheless placed in relation to a “national interest” that is wanted to be socially neutral.
The bipolar world of the Cold War was not simply divided between two blocs of States, but between two different social systems (capitalism and a totalitarian bureaucratic statism or “state socialism”). Inversely, the great powers of today’s multipolar world are unequal, but homogeneous as regards social relations: they are very different capitalisms.
Beyond the information content and interest of partial analysis, the prevailing theories of international relations are based on fetishism of the State and are seriously limited in explaining historical process – for example, collapse of the Soviet system.
…
Another way of looking at the question is that US foreign policy oscillates between making the country an example for the world – therefore with limited inclination to interventionism – and acting as a crusader state actively engaged in promotion of democracy throughout the world.
The reality is much more complex and contradictory than these simplifications: for example, it can be said that the Bush Jr. presidency began under the banner of example and moderation, and then developed badly as a crusade against terrorism and for the “promotion of democracy”.
All US administrations between the 20th and 21st centuries have experienced considerable fluctuations, both in the face of development of their actions and because of unforeseen events.
Each administration has its own characteristic slogan “to sell” on the domestic and international political market, a certain rhetoric with which it seeks to differentiate itself from the previous one and which conveys a certain basic vision or attitude or a political priority.
Sometimes, more or less appropriately, there is talk of “doctrines”: containment of communism, “never another Cuba”, Vietnamisation, “hands off the Persian Gulf”, rollback (retreat of communism) and support for “freedom fighters”, “new world order”, engagement and enlargement, and so on.
These must be understood as tactical assumptions of the exercise of more or less soft or hard forms of power, ways of articulating relations between economic interests and geopolitics, of selecting political and military priorities, but always within the limits of the fundamental purposes indicated above.
All administrations inherit problems and policies, just as they all have to face new international problems with their internal repercussions. This is how both the relative continuity of the problems and policies and the specificities of the various administrations of US imperialism are defined.
They are in fact variations within historical periods which, taken together, are the result of developments in world society in which the American superpower plays its own cards – as indeed the Soviet Union in the past and Russia and China today –, which however escape the control of any political power.
6. The dangerous contradictions of the Trump administration’s foreign policy
With reference to foreign affairs, Teddy Roosevelt recommended: “Speak softly and carry a big stick, you will go far”. Trump instead shakes a big stick dangerously, but at the same time talks or “tweets” a lot, continuously and provocatively.
On strategic ground, the Trump administration intends to relaunch the “unipolar moment” following the Soviet collapse – when America emerged as the lone superpower (2017 NSS) –, recovering, in his opinion, the time wasted since the early 90s and especially, of course, by Obama, which allowed other players to implement consistently “their long-term plans to challenge America”.
A first consideration is that this “unipolar moment”, even if it ever existed, sank in the first decade of the new century. The window of opportunity has closed and cannot be opened with nostalgia, but it can still be dangerous precisely because it is unrealistic.
Secondly, the maintenance or restoration of a unipolar system of unquestionable primacy requires what in jargon is called multilateralism, which does not at all mean privileging the United Nations and the imperialist oligarchy of its Security Council (as China and Russia, which there have veto power, would like), but strengthening and extending alliances avoiding above all irritating and offending political allies and international economic partners in various ways for internal propaganda purposes.
Even the neoconservatives most prone to unilateral actions that spurn the United Nations have never underestimated the importance of NATO and the creation of ad hoc alliances: from their point of view, the determination of the United States to act, “if necessary” in a unilateral way – an omnipresent formula –, is not the opposite of multilateralism, but a way of promoting it in terms corresponding to the “national interest” of the United States, which would be that of the world.
The neoconservative principle states that it should be the mission that creates alliances, not vice versa. In the meantime, however, Republican neoconservatives have at least partly learned the lesson, tending to converge with neoliberal Democrats on the idea of building a “concert of democracies” that can act collectively: in this case the mission would coincide with the nature of the alliance.
Finally, political primacy and military intervention require that concessions be made at the economic level: reconciling the claim to be the international political leader of an open world economy with intransigent and narrow-minded economic nationalism is improbable.
All US administrations have placed the problem of costs on the allies, and not without positive results; nevertheless the question should be treated diplomatically and delicately, not trumpeted to the four winds with blackmailing tones.
This explains the harsh judgments of Trump by so many aggressive neoconservatives, as well as neoliberals.
Before assuming the presidency it would have been possible to interpret Trump’s foreign policy as vaguely Nixonian, but inverted: approach Russia to put pressure on China. Already very problematic, this possible line seems to have fallen and been almost overturned.
Richard Nixon worked coherently in a particularly critical moment: in a nationalistic move, declaration of the inconvertibility of the dollar extended the freedom of economic manoeuvre of the United States, albeit also with unexpected effects.
At the same time he started “Vietnamisation” of the war and began a special relationship with Mao’s China, thus putting pressure on the Soviet Union, almost a de facto alliance which, in retrospect, can be understood as the beginning of the end of Stalinist-style “communism”.
Further, after the Soviet collapse, a certain coherence of intent between political strategy and economic strategy can also be seen in the policies of Bush Sr. and Clinton in the management of transition in Central and Eastern Europe, in enlargement of NATO, in promotion of international economic agreements, in liberalisation of economies – the so-called Washington Consensus – and in multilateral military interventions.
Obama tried to scale back the political failures of the adventurism of Bush Jr. – who for a few years had been favoured by a giant speculative bubble – by re-launching economic multilateralism and “resetting” relations with Russia, until explosion of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, a popular revolt against one of the oligarchies that alternated in power (in this case the one centred on the Donbass and most linked to Russia) in which the Western powers and Russia obviously looked after their interests and played their dirty games.
Finally, Obama began an economic and a politico-military reorientation towards Asia.
As already mentioned, the unilateralism/multilateralism dichotomy is not adequate for explaining foreign policy, which is always a mixture that varies with situations, time and also fields: it is a problem to create situations of mediation that lead to a balance between national security strategy and international economic policy.
Trump, however, disregards already agreed economic agreements, threatens trades wars and withdraws from climate agreements. He says he wants to put an end to the most important strategic agreement in which the European Union participates, the one with Iran on its nuclear programme (he seems to have been contradicted by his secretary of State, Rex Tillerson).
He uses brinkmanship (…) to handle the nuclear issue with North Korea, while it should diplomatically involve China, Russia and Japan, as in the past. He also recognises Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, a symbolic move that is a slap in the face of the hypocrisy of international diplomacy.
His restructuring of taxation, the increase in military spending and the request to finance a vague investment programme in infrastructures is likely to lead to an increase in public debt that is indigestible for the tax orthodoxy of members of Congress.
Trump moves like a bull in a china shop, so that contradictions are added to contradictions.
In the language of international relations, as regards the strategy of “national security”, the unipolarist intent is in contradiction with the line of unilateralism; in turn, that intent is contradicted by the nationalism of economic strategy which allows a multipolar world, but populated by unfair competitors that have to be brought back to order.
The America First strategy essentially seems to have been designed to win the elections and from a reductively nationalistic point of view, not up to the whole, global and long-term interests of American capitalism and its allies.
America First is actually America Alone, and this cannot last. Paradoxically, it combines a megalomaniac line that ignores the limits of American military power with underestimation of the force of attraction of its capitalism.
If Trump wanted to be unpredictable, he certainly succeeded. It is the reason for the uncertainty, confusion and variety of assessments about the course of his foreign policy.
Unpredictability itself is destabilising and can be understood as an effective strategy against an opponent, but against allies? And for how long can it work? How useful is it for the credibility of the aims pursued? Is it not the attitude of a poker player inclined to bluffing? And what will happen when the other players want to “see” the cards?
For more than twenty years, the government of North Korea has been following a tactic with a pattern that is now clear: periodically and deliberately raising tension, then negotiating to obtain something in return for an apparent step backwards in its nuclear programme, until the next tension-negotiated time.
When Trump “tweets” in response to the dynastic heir of North Korea: “I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his”, it could bring to mind certain confrontations between kids, but it also shows a dangerous tendency towards brinkmanship.
In this scheme of things, a first risk is that the game gets out of hand; or that the boasted about North American “button” proves to be a disappointment, with consequent loss of credibility.
From the point of view of the interests of imperialism, Trump’s foreign policy is inconsistent and wrong in method and merit – he is the worst President since the Second World War, probably even for a century. Optimists hope it can be properly corrected: but they must come to terms with the definitive imperial nature that the presidency assumed around the middle of the 20th century.
Presidential power in the fields of defence and foreign policy has extended far beyond the letter of the Constitution and is defended in terms and for situations that would have been unacceptable even for the most interventionist of 19th century Presidents.
The trend is irreversible because it rests on structural changes in American society and relations with the world: for this reason the “imperial presidency” can be understood as a gradual accumulation of precedents and a voluntary delegation of powers by Congress.
With resolutions such as those on Formosa’s defence in 1955, on the Middle East in 1957, following the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, and the authorisation to use military force on September 14, 2001 – to cite some historical examples –, the Congress has voluntarily and enthusiastically handed over to the President of the day the power that the Constitution attributes to it: deciding when and against whom to declare war and to authorise limited military operations other than in self-defence.
The fact is explained by bipartisan convergence around the fundamental objectives of foreign policy and is legitimised by the ever-increasing extension of the concept of defence, up to preventive action even before a threat is manifested concretely. The thesis is at the least constitutionally very debatable, but materially consistent with the global dimension of US imperialism and the resistance it has to deal with.
However, the strength of the “imperial presidency” is not an invariable given. When Congress wants to exercise its deliberative and controlling powers, then the imperial character of the presidency is reduced (as in the first years after the Watergate scandal), or it must take directions that are politically and criminally risky.
The worst moment for Reagan, for example, was the Iran-Hezbollāh-Contra scandal, originating from the fact that the Administration had to find a way to circumvent the limits and prohibitions imposed by Congress on the financing of anti-Sandinista guerrillas: a completely illegal intercontinental fraud involving the sale of anti-aircraft missiles to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages held by Hezbollāh in Lebanon, and then channelling the 18 million dollars gained from the exchange to the Contras in Nicaragua.
Clinton’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by the Republican majority in Congress: the situation of divided government – presidency and majority of both chambers from different parties – is now more frequent than in the past and may therefore weaken the administration’s line or reject initiatives, such as the ratification of treaties.
The contrast concerns the means and methods, not the fundamental aims of foreign and defence policies: nevertheless, in certain crises it can have important consequences.
In addition to the rivalry between parties, the attitude of Congress towards the President’s foreign policy depends on factors such as the success of presidential initiatives, the popularity of the President (and thus the convenience or not for legislators to align with the administration), and the intensity with which an international threat is perceived, which makes it possible to play the patriotic card of rallying round the flag, of national unity.
On the other hand, the stronger the opposition to war in society and the lower the popularity and legitimacy of a President – and Trump won 2.9 million votes less than Hillary Clinton, a negative record –, the greater the repercussions on relations between President and Congress and the divergences among and within elements of the state apparatus.
The unsurpassed levels of popularity peaks for Bush Sr. at the beginning of the attack on Iraq and for Bush Jr. after the attacks of 2001 did not prevent the former from losing the 1992 presidential elections and the latter from sinking into unpopularity, again unsurpassed.
Trump was unable to prevent Congress from approving a law that envisaged new sanctions against Russia (and Iran and North Korea) at the end of July 2017. A certain freedom for manoeuvre in the more or less rapid and effective application of these sanctions obviously remains with the head of the executive, but the obligation remains: on this basis, in fact, he is criticised.
It is a constraint determined by an overwhelming two-party majority that is a clear sign: 98 in favour and 2 against in the Senate, 419 in favour and 3 against in the House of Representatives. Curiously, these votes are almost identical to those for the resolutions on the Gulf of Tonkin (88 to 2 in the Senate, 416 to 0 in the House) and of September 14, 2001 (98 to 2 in the Senate, 420 to 1 in the House).
Consequently, the optimists’ hopes are not without foundation; however they are very precarious and uncertain. Adjustments to worldview, rhetoric and electoral promises should be so important as to result in a decidedly non-Trumpian foreign policy. This would be quite a problem for the coherence and credibility of the President of the major world power, who cannot be easily removed nor does he appear to have serious health problems, at the moment.
From the point of view of the oppressed and exploited, is this good news? Not exactly, because the “normal” imperfections of imperialism are compounded by the dangers that can arise from incoherence and unpopularity.
Gallup polls reveal that the approval rate for Trump is at the level of that of Bush Jr.’s second term: an average of 39 and 37% respectively – a disaster that is all the more significant because the United States is not currently in recession and the unemployment rate is at the lowest since the beginning of the century.
This is the final consideration: if the idea that the 9/11 attacks were fabricated by some body of the US government is idiotic, we cannot exclude that Trump will create some international crisis in the hope that the people will unite around the flag he has waved.