Preliminary remarks
Actually Syria is an important part of a great imperialist game, which goes beyond the problem of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship supported by religious minorities. Active subjects in this game are fundamental members of the Sunni Islamic majority. They carry on an uninterrupted war against the Shiite Islamism. After a long time this Islamic minority (10-12%) began again a strategy of counter-attacks after the Khomeinist revolution in Iran, and now the Sunni intentions aim at subjugating again the Shiite communities out of Iran (to eliminate them would be the best), if necessary through bloody actions from Iraq to Syria, from Qatar to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, from Afghanistan to Pakistan. In this manner Shiism would be a purely Iranian phenomenon (it is almost impossible to extirpate it from Iran).
Once more, unfortunately, we must regret the inadequacy of the information provided by the whole of Italian mass-media, excessively prone to United States propaganda; so that a common reader understands next to nothing about the present events in the Islamic world. We find a typical example in the manner of representing the Islamic radicalism: it is always impossible to understand its ideological and religious dimension; moreover we notice that if the public opinion is kept on the alert (being really dangerous this form of radicalism), never in the alarm it is underlined the role of Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless this country (but it’s allied of the United States is the most important financing and supporter of the Islamic radicalism. A very dangerous game, because sooner or later the “monster” will turn its actions against the Saudi monarchy; but it will be another history.
When also important media spoke about the Islamic radicalism hardly ever they underline its Sunni ideological and religious roots; and in the exceptional contrary cases this reality is only mentioned. It is easy to saw the tares with the wheat, but in this manner we have only political propaganda, not information: so that it became “normal” to present Iran as part of the Islamic radicalism. A practical and theoretical great error.
Statistics show that the sanguinary terroristic praxis of the Islamic radicalism is of Sunni groups (99,9%), and not Shiite ones. Unless we consider terrorism the military action of Hezbollah against the Zionist entity, not considering the character of liberation and defensive struggle. Appearing news about attempts in Iraq or Pakistan generally it is not stressed that the slaughterers are Sunni groups and the victims are Shiite. The liberation struggle of the Shiites in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia becomes a political problem changed into matter of public order, and Hezbollah’s obvious support to Assad appears expression of a shared evil, and not cohesion against a common and deadly enemy.
On the theoretic plane the media avoid to underline the important aspect distinguishing a Shiite society from the typical models wanted by the radical Sunnis. We could cut down the description saying “Shiites and Talibans or Salafis are not the same thing”, but it would not be sufficient. Obviously, nobody of us would like to live in Teheran or Baghdad today, but on the other side we must consider the differences with the Taliban Kabul, for example. The Iranian revolution created an Islamic Republic based on the Western constitutionalism, and really its Costitution proclames the popular sovereignty (although under the superiority of the Islamic religion); besides in Iran we have elections, juridical protection of minority rights and so on. It is important that are studying in the Iranian University more women than men (on the contrary under the Sunni radicalism not even little girls would go to school). Too easy to write books on the negative elements of such a society, but it is true that Shiism is engaged in the effort to build an Islamic society for the XXI century, and the Sunni radicalism has the purpose of moulding every Islamic society according to its vision of the first Islamic centuries. It is possible to add that this particular vision of a return to the past is a nasty trick, because the historical studies on that period disclose a past completely different: so that we find the myth of a never existed past. Unfortunately the radical groups want to realize this invention by all means, also against Muslim opponents: they are considered apostates and may be killed light-heartedly. The sinister slogan today recurring in the Syrian territories occupied by the “freedom fighters” against Assad – “the Alawites to the coffin, and the Christians to Beirut” – is Sunni, but an inverse one on the Shiite side does not exist.
Shiism extremely synthetized
In front of Islam common people in Europe are rather culturally disarmed, because at school do not learn anything useful, and in the predominant information stereotyped images and banalities are privileged. On the other side the situation is not better: if in the centre of Western fantasies there is the image of a Moore with a scimitar in his hand, sensual and pillager, on the Muslim side a Crusader eager for gain, blood and Islamic women or the more modern version of an exploiting colonialist are the ordinary images.
In a situation of general poor knowledge about Islamism the ignorance concerning the Shiism (from the origins a very important Islamic minority) is total. Europe had few possibilities to know this peculiar muslim enemy in the Middle Age. In fact, the great Fatimid caliphate (Shiite), dominator in a part of Northern Africa (with Egypt), in Sicily and Syria ended when the famous Salah ad-Din took the power. Afterwards the hostilities went on between European and Sunnis only (the Ottoman Empire was the stronger Sunni offensive and defensive bulwark. In the French speaking countries the monumental work by Henry Corbin gave the possibility of a deeper knowledge of this Islamic component. Simply are the reasons why Shiism is worth of a great consideration. If today we can speak about the magnificent Islamic civilization of the Middle Age, it is due to three factors: 1° the liberal Muslim civilization flourished in the Iberian peninsula, from the Umayyad caliphate of Córdoba to the last Islamic kingdoms born from the breaking up of that caliphate; 2° the caliphate of Damask and the initial period of the Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad - that is before the Sunni intolerance introduced a lethal cultural totalitarianism into the Islamic societies; 3° the theosophical and philosophic production of the Shiism.
The opposition between the Sunnis (from sunnah tradition) and the Shiites (from shi’ia party - obviously of ‘Alī) was born from the dissidence in order to the rights of ‘Alī (son-in-law of Muhāmmad) to succeed the Prophet as Caliph, that is guide of the Islamic community (the followers of ‘Alī indicted the Sunnis to have suppressed parts of Koran testifying the primacy of ‘Alī). The controverse - born as political struggle - became progressively also religious because of the development of an autonomous Shiite theology, whose fundamental centre is the metaphysical and esoteric figure of imām (in the Shiism tooke the place of the Caliph). If we would realize a queer parallel with the Christian world (surely insufficient and wrong) we could put side by side Sunnis and Western Christians (Catholics and Protestants) on one hand; Shiites and Eastern Christians on the other hand.
To go into the theological labyrinth of the Islamic theology is out of our aims, and in any case an enormous library exists for understanding how and when two realities, both born from the primary Islam, became different and enemies. Here it is sufficient to have clear that either the Shiites or the Sunnis consider themselves incarnation of the true Islam and their counterpart are expression of heresy.
But the heresies are not potentially equals. In order to understand why the Shiites have been always persecuted by the Sunni powers helped by fanaticized masses, it is necessary to look at the whole Shiite history, and not only at the Iranian Shiism from the 18th century. In that period, after the victory of the Safavid dynasty the Shiism became a sort of “Church”, ayatollāh and mullāh became a sort of priestly order. Along the time the Shiism (and not the Sunnism) has been animated by a non-legalistic and spiritualist charge, acting in consequence; besides looked for the prophetic and spiritual senses hidden in the Koran, gave life to the Sufism (afterwards influenced also Sunni sectors), eclectic and spiritually libertarian. It is not accidental that the extremely spiritualist Bahai heresy was born in Shiite Iranian milieu.
In addition, we find two other dangerous elements – not existing in the Sunni societies: a disposition to social radicalism and the defence of a self-organization also under a not Shiite and enemy power. It is meaningful that the Ottoman Sultans (they were Caliphs as well) were obliged to resort to many military campaigns for subjecting the Shiites (the so-called Qizilbashis, or Red Caps) in their territories.
The consequences of French and Britain imperialism and the Shiite counter-attack
After the Great War the imperialist occupation and the division of the Arabic territories belonged to the Ottoman empire used local Sunni dominators – even though subordinated to the Western powers – also where existed Shiite majorities, as in Iraq and Bahrain. In Lebanon the French power acted as if these troublesome Moslem heretics didn’t exist. In the collective imaginary, not only in Europe, the Shiism appeared an Iranian phenomenon, therefore peripheral and negligible.
Nothing changed till the Khomeinist revolution. The watershed in the history of the contemporary Shiism is there. In Iran the Shiites (not only by themselves, to say the truth but, considering the outcome, it becomes negligible) overthrew a westernized regime and built their Islamic State: a criticizable State from a Sunni point of view, but in any case an Iranian Republic had been created among the other nations. And if such a result were been realized by the Shiites…
In parallel two phenomenons developed, and they were destined to encounter themselves strongly: the Iranian ideological expansionism toward the areas of the Arabic world occupied by Shiites, and the new force gained by the Sunni extremism, also by the grace of the inconsiderate support furnished by the United States for the struggle in Afghanistan against USSR.
The first phenomenon necessarily worried the Sunni governments of the Near East, because one of its first manifestation was since starts with the confrontation about holy places of the Islam guardianship’s held by the Sauds, radical Sunnis as Wahabis. And in Lebanon the Shiite movement Amal guided by Nabih Berry – using weapons and social organization – showed the existence of Shiite Arabs no more sleeperers; afterwards it was the turn of Hezbollah, more mightily. In concrete Iran found opened many possibilities of influences in a vast area. In such a context for the Shiite counter-attack it became strategic to form an alliance with Syria, in spite of her secular government (Christmas, for example, is a Syrian national festivity) held by Alawites, a religious minority, in precedence persecuted and – without entering in complexes theological details – susceptible to be considered a heterodox branch of the Shiism. And in fact the Syrian regime made all the possible to get from Teheran the official “patent” of Shiism.
The Arabic governments (particularly those in the Persian Gulf), beyond every formal applause, immediately considered a danger the Iranian revolution; a danger in terms both religious both political, and this feeling was expressed by the remarkable Saudi support to Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran, in spite of being the regime of Baghdad a clear enemy also for the Saudi monarchy. That war had a result that can be seen according to the metaphoric bottle half empty but half full: Khomeini’s regime still existed, and beyond every propagandist nonsense it was the important thing for the Sunni regimes. Moreover the Lebanese Hezbollah afterwards would be circumfused with of military glory struggling against the Zionist entity. Besides, a time bomb were the oppressed Shiite minorities in Bahrain and even in Saudi Arabia (where the Shiites are concentrated just in the most important oil zones). In this global situation it became essential to weaken the Teheran-Damask axe, vital for both the countries in cause.
As usual, the aim has been the weakest partner: Syria, after all guilty to be allied with Hezbollah. Consequently, the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon - so much appreciated in precedence, when the important thing was to end the Lebanese civil war (a civil war lasting without winners, and obstacle to the lucrative investments for the country’s reconstruction) - suddenly became worth to be demonized and considered the real cause of all Lebanese troubles. If we look at the results, it is possible to say that the old Hafez al-Assad would have done better to save his soul and not to give any support to the Western coalition in the first war against Saddam Hussein.
In Syria - suddenly and in absence of any meaningful change in the local political situation - demonstrations of plaza are developed with initial and unexceptionable claims of die democrat to which the regime has given a violent and self-defeating answer. At the beginning of the demonstrations the Syrian regime - still having at the moment an intact strength - would have been able to play the papers of the politics, and first of all to cause divisions inside the adverse front. Not having done, now we have to speak about a different scenery.
The Sunni act above board
A biblical verse says in the Latin version “Quos Deus perdere vult eos dementat”. Probably God wants to lose everyone wants not to see in order to the Syrian revolt. Also adherents to it now show to have well clear the danger accompanying them. Let us take a man in precedence unknown, but to day sought by many Western media: the young general Manaf Tlass, beautiful, cultured, affirmed playboy, exponent of the rich burgoisie dorée of Damask, up to yesterday integrated in the regime, and today the tallest in degree among the deserters of the Syrian Army. In a typical journalistic syndrome of simplification various headings introduce him as the potential new strong man of Syria, after the possible fall of Assad. It is not sure, just in the light of the characteristics and origins of this man (but never say never), and of certain his declarations whose objective character is beyond any doubt. Speaking Tlass about the necessity to solve the Syrian crisis with guarantees against divisions and sectarian struggles, he expresses an auspice born by a concrete worry, considering the situation on the field. In any case Tlass necessarily knows that in the self-named Free Syrian Army the deserters (Sunni) of the regular Army are only a component in the whole, and in all probability not the majority, being the rest made of Syrian jihadists and Moslem mercenaries (eventually tied up to the franchising of al-Qaeda), financed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and US, with bases in Turkey and training organized by the CIA. So that the situation do not appear capable to dissipate the fears of Tlass.
And last but non least we have the declarations of jihadists part in the revolt, that could be gathered under the title “This is clarity!”. Radiant example is what recently declared to the Lebanese newspaper L’Orient Le Jour by the Salafi Muhammad Sensaui; this man at the frontier place of Bab al-Hawa, between Syria and Turkey, expressed unequivocally the project for which he fights: "We will make an Islamic State up to Lebanon, where are bitches and casinos".
Of the peer the ex dentist Muhammad Firas, converted him in head of a group of militiamen of Allah, you/he/she has frankly said that that all know and all fear: “You will see after the fall of the regime who is the strongest on the ground and who can govern the country”. Free translation: “the struggle for the power will be bloody and they will prevail the weapons”. We hope that is right Hassan Abu Haniyeh, Jordan expert of Islamic groups according to which the actual one brings military of the jihadists would have secondary character; and we hope that then continuous this way. But it is sure what the non Italian mass-media underline the constant influx of Islamic extremists from Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and even from Great Britain, Belgium and the United States.
How it is possible the actual Syrian Government resistance
In the precedent article on Syria we remembered that a part of the Sunni middle class still sustains the regime, in spite of this one is losing single “pieces” (recently nothing less than that a Prime Minister, Riad Hijab). But individual desertions, of civilians as of soldiers, are only relatively dangerous; the contrary would be in case of desertions of whole unities of the Army, that would bring to the rebels armaments and chains of command. Till now no defection of particular entity from the Armed happened, and in the Army many militaries of Sunni origin acts. The Alawites are surely the hard core in the Army, but not 2/3 of the officers. In any case until the 20-30% of the no Alawite officers will stay faithful, the Syrian Armed will be able to struggle. Actually Assad can trust the elite forces – Republican Guard and Fourth Armoured Division – and a regular Army in majority not Alawite, the intelligence services and the high military hierarchy.
As already mentioned in the precedent article, the Syrian conflict progressively turned into religious and ethnic struggle type, but according to Aram Nerguizian, analyst in the American "Strategic and International Studies" of the United States, this change could also constitute a positive element for al-Assad. Naturally in the limits of Assad’s capacity to not turn against him definitely the majority of Syrian population; otherwise the same element would become source of weakness.
Teheran is in the target, and for this reason must support al-Assad
For Teheran the maintenance of the actual Syrian regime has not only a fundamental strategic interest, but it is of tactical interest that the Syrian government’s resistance lasts till the new presidential elections in the United States. The reason is simple: a Zionist attack against the Iranian nuclear installations will happen before that date, because an objective assumed by Netanyahu’s government is the defeat of Obama. In fact the Zionist government is convinced that the its intervention in Iran would be cause a hard hit to the actual politics of Washington, and it could give again strength and vigour to the political right in the United States. Obviously if this attack would happen after a change of regime in Damask, or at the same time, Teheran as well would receive a second hard hit. We have also to consider that in the Zionist entities are sorcerer’s apprentices, supported by political circles in Washington, that are waiting an Iranian military answer against Israel so strong to force an US’ intervention: that is a war between Usa and Iran.
The time doesn’t work for the Shiite axis, as the Iranian government knows well. So that in the last August 9 Iran gave hospitality in Teheran to an international reunion on the Syrian crisis, presided by the Minister of Foreign Affairs ‘Ali Akbar Salehi. Representatives of 29 countries and the UN organisms existing in that country participated; that is the States not supporting the Syrian rebels: Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Benin, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
The Iranian Minister Salehi after the collective meeting invited government and Syrian rebels to a meeting in Iran, and some organizations of the rebels have already declared its wish to participate. Besides Iran proposed a truces in the fights after the end of the Ramadan (it means since August 19) so that to create an atmosphere more favourable to contacts between the parts. Iran, therefore, is developing a large diplomatic action to solve the Syrian crisis taking care of avoiding devastating effects in the area and reaffirming its own role in the same zone. Will Iran succeed in this enterprise?
Meanwhile the relationships between Iran and Turkey are changing even more. First of all: the Iranian Chief of Staff, general Hassan Firouzabadi, has formally accused Ankara to encourage the bath of blood in Syria furnishing weapons to the rebels, warning Turkey that, after Syria, the Islamic extremism (can we guess which is?) could address its operations against Turkey. Ankara has reacted, Teheran has suspended the exemption of the visa-free travels for Turkish citizens. Dulcis in fundo the government of Baghdad, guided by a Shiite, has announced a revaluation of its the relationships with Turkey.
[English translation by the Author]
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